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Authority is modelled as the right to undertake a non-contractible
decision in a joint project. We show that the allocation of author-
ity depends on bargaining power and diﬀerences in both parties cost
functions. The decision-maker is assumed to exert an externality on
the other parties. Overall surplus is shared according to generalized
Nash bargaining. Under limited liability, the agent with the larger
cost parameter receives authority if the agents’ cost parameters are
very diﬀerent. If the agents have similar cost parameters, bargaining
power determines the allocation of authority. Possible applications
include the introduction of a new product.
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This paper analyzes the allocation of authority in a joint project. Authority
is viewed as the right to undertake a project-oriented decision. This decision
aﬀects not only the decision-maker but also some other parties involved. If
the decision itself is non-contractible, limited liability creates distortion be-
cause of a trade oﬀ between surplus maximization and rent extraction. How
this trade oﬀ is solved depends on two factors. First, the diﬀerences between
the agents’ cost functions are decisive. Second, the relationship between an
agent’s costs and her bargaining power is also inﬂuential. Our setup allows to
analyze the impact of limited liability, which is the only source of distortion
in our model.
In detail, the project-oriented decision determines all parties’ costs as
well as the project’s success probability and therefore its expected outcome.
The success of the project is assumed to be observable so that the contract
between the parties can specify transfer payments conditional on success and
failure. If the project-oriented decision is contractible, the ﬁrst-best outcome
which maximizes overall surplus is implemented. In case of a non-contractible
decision, the right to undertake the decision is contractually assigned to the
decision-maker. The decision-maker is considered to have full authority. As
long as transfers are unrestricted, the ﬁrst-best is reached even though the
decision itself is non-contractible. Transfer payments are used to incentivize
the decision-maker who can be compensated for a ﬁrst-best eﬃcient decision.
Since payments condition on project outcome, they are carried out ex post
after the project is done. As long as the transfers simply lead to a sharing of
the realized project output, this is unproblematic. But in some settings, a net
payment ex post might not be enforceable. For example, wealth constraints
might prevent a party from carrying out such payments. Since this problem
is anticipated by all parties, it seems reasonable to restrict the set of possible
transfers to those which simply implement a sharing of the realized output.
That is, limited liability is assumed. Due to limited liability, the decision-
maker can no longer be compensated for a surplus-maximizing decision. She
chooses opportunistically a project which is in her own interest and cannot
be incentivized to choose the ﬁrst-best project. In general, a project diﬀerent
from ﬁrst-best is implemented. If authority is allocated exogenously to the
agent with the larger costs, the surplus is larger compared to the alternative
allocation of authority. But if the agents bargain over authority, they do not
necessarily end up with this allocation. We show that bargaining instead
allocates authority to the one with the smaller costs if and only if the parties
2are not too diﬀerent concerning their cost functions and the party with the
smaller costs has a large bargaining power. It turns out that this party’s deci-
sion leads to a smaller overall surplus compared to the alternative allocation,
but authority enables her to extract a larger share of the rent. This is shown
to be beneﬁcial to her if the parties are not too diﬀerent in costs (ensuring
that the decrease in surplus is not too large) and her bargaining power is
large (ensuring that the increase in rent share is large). Due to her large
bargaining power, this party is able to receive the desired authority. If the
cost structures of the parties are quite diﬀerent, bargaining power does not
inﬂuence the allocation of authority and the one with the larger costs decides.
Whenever several persons or institutions undertake a joint project, deci-
sions which might inﬂuence all involved parties have to be made. Who should
and who will make such a decision in a world of incomplete contracts? This
question arises in very diﬀerent applications. For example, consider two ﬁrms
or two departments within one ﬁrm working on a new product. While one
ﬁrm resp. department designs the product, the other one is working on a
marketing strategy. Decisions about the quality of the product or the in-
cluded features have an impact on both parties. A high-quality or complex
product is harder to develop and more diﬃcult to explain to the customers.
On the other hand, such a quality-decision also inﬂuences the expected sales.
As another example, take two ﬁrms forming a research joint venture or two
departments of a ﬁrm working on a joint research project. The two parties
have to decide what kind of scientiﬁc experiment to carry out. If they con-
duct a complex experiment, their workload and therefore their costs increase
while the expected outcome is inﬂuenced as well. They are able to ﬁnd more
relevant results than within a simpler framework. Similar ideas apply to
co-authorship. All these examples have in common that a certain project-
oriented decision inﬂuences the costs of all parties as well as the expected
outcome independently of who makes the decision.
If the project-oriented decision is contractible, the involved parties may
specify it in a contract. But in many situations, contracts are necessarily
incomplete. A variable might be non-contractible because it is unobservable
to a third party or unveriﬁable in court. Even if all contractual partners
observe this variable, they cannot enforce the contract in a trial. In addition,
it might be too costly to specify everything in detail. Instead of specifying
the project in a contract, one can determine who has the right to make the
remaining decisions. This concept of the allocation of authority is used in
Grossman and Hart (1986), Aghion and Bolton (1992), or Bester (2005).
3The property rights approach according to Grossman and Hart (1986) usu-
ally assumes a decision that is not describable at the contracting stage but
veriﬁable at the bargaining stage, while the action in Aghion and Bolton
(1992) and Bester (2005) remains unveriﬁable ex post. We follow the latter
approach and assume that the project-oriented decision remains unveriﬁable
ex post. Only project output can be contracted upon. The complexity of
a scientiﬁc experiment or the detailed quality properties of a new product
are too hard to identify for a third party, especially a court. Aghion and
Rey (2003) analyze contracts which simply allocate authority and show that
their optimality is often robust to the introduction of message games under
ex post non-veriﬁability, which justiﬁes the restriction to this class of models
in our paper.
The enforcement of an allocation of authority is not speciﬁed in our model
explicitly. Grossman and Hart (1986) as well as Hart and Moore (1990) use
asset ownership to enforce authority. The owner of an asset has residual
rights of control, that is the right to undertake any decision not determined
in the contract. Rajan and Zingales (1998) use access to assets instead of
ownership to allocate authority. A speciﬁc privileged access to a resource
is more restrictive than residual rights of control. Our model ﬁts into the
framework of residual control rights as well as privileged access to assets.
Since there is only one decision to be undertaken, it makes no diﬀerence if
the decision-maker has residual rights of control or just access to an asset
which enables her to determine this single decision. Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy (1999) constitute informal authority via repeated interaction, which
suits our model as well. Many partnerships continue over several periods.
For example, two departments of a ﬁrm working together probably expect
that there will be further joint projects in the future.
All parties incur costs from undertaking the project. These costs might be
disutility from work, caused from eﬀort to spend. But the decision analyzed
here is not an eﬀort choice in the usual sense. An eﬀort choice as modeled
in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and other papers inﬂuences the decision-makers
costs only. In the applications considered here, the decision determines the
costs of all parties involved. It can be considered as an externality the
decision-maker exerts on the other parties. This is a key feature of our model
which distinguishes it from the literature on eﬀort choice: It is not only the
decision-maker whose costs are aﬀected by the decision. Bester (2005) also
analyzes a model of externalities and the allocation of authority in a ﬁrm,
but deals with asymmetric information. Aghion and Tirole (1997) describe
4how authority inﬂuences the agent’s incentive to acquire information and
therefore focus on the impact of delegation on the information structure. In
contrast, Dessein (2002) and Bester (2005) take the information structure as
given and analyze the revelation of the given information, which might be
viewed as communication. Bester (2005) supports truthful revelation of the
agent’s private information through the possibility of trading authority. In
Dessein (2002), the principal chooses either to delegate the decision rights
to the better informed agent or to keep authority and communicate with
the agent about his private information. While delegation causes a loss of
control, keeping authority causes a loss of information because communica-
tion is noisy. In our model, the information structure is given as well, but
in contrast to Dessein (2002) and Bester (2005), information is completely
symmetric.
Most of the mentioned papers model the allocation of authority to be the
job of a principal who makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to an agent. Instead
of a principal-agent model, we consider the broader approach of two agents
who share the expected overall surplus according to generalized Nash bar-
gaining. In many applications, it is reasonable to assume some diﬀerences
in bargaining power whereas a principal-agent model seems to constitute too
much asymmetry between the parties. In, for example, Grossman and Hart
(1986) as well as Aghion and Rey (2003), bargaining takes place ex post so
that the contract, esp. the allocation of authority, determines the starting
point of the bargaining procedure. In diﬀerence, our model uses ex ante
bargaining at the contracting stage. Therefore, the terms of contract and es-
pecially the allocation of authority are not the starting point, but the result
of the bargaining.
If the parties involved are wealth-constraint or a party cannot be forced
contractually to pay something ex post, it seems reasonable to assume limited
liability. Imposing limited liability constraints creates a trade-oﬀ between
rent extraction and surplus maximization which leads to an overall surplus
lower than ﬁrst-best in our model. It is no longer possible to compensate the
decision-maker for a surplus-maximizing decision. While Aghion and Bolton
(1992) and Aghion and Rey (2003) analyze parties with diﬀerent wealth,
our model assumes both parties’ liability to be limited completely. This
is a reasonable assumption if it is impossible to enforce ex post payments.
In Aghion and Rey (2003), ex post eﬃciency is increased if (under wealth
constraints) authority is allocated to the party with the lower bargaining
power. But in our model, it does not depend on bargaining power which
5allocation creates a larger surplus. It always results in a larger surplus to let
the party with the larger cost parameter decide. But bargaining power might
inﬂuence the allocation of authority because the allocation is a bargaining
outcome. If the agents are very diﬀerent in cost parameters, bargaining
power does not inﬂuence the allocation of authority. Both agents beneﬁt
from the larger surplus created by the decision of the agent with the larger
cost parameter. Surplus maximization is favored over rent extraction. But if
the agents are similar in cost parameters, the allocation of authority hardly
inﬂuences overall surplus and rent extraction becomes more important. The
allocation of authority now depends on bargaining power.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes a formal
model of the allocation of authority in a joint project. The benchmark case
of contractible project choice is analyzed in section 3. Section 4 studies
non-contractible project choice, while in section 5 the allocation of authority
under limited liability is examined. A brief summary of the results and
conclusions as well as some open research questions are given in section 6.
2 The Model
This section describes a formal model of the allocation of authority under
limited liability. The timing of the contract game is as follows: In the ini-
tial stage, the agents bargain and sign the contract. If project choice is
contractible, it is determined in the contract. In case of non-contractible
project choice, the contract speciﬁes the decision-maker, who chooses one
of the possible projects. The project is undertaken, private costs occur and
project output is realized. The payment scheme is executed. The details are
given in the remaining section. To illustrate the assumptions, we consider
the example of two ﬁrms working together on a new product.
Two agents i = 1,2 jointly undertake a project. They negotiate a contract
in order to specify the terms of their partnership. The agents could be, for
example, a scientist developing a new product and an advertising director
creating the marketing strategy. We elaborate an example below.
There is a set of possible projects D = [0,1]. Every project can either
succeed or fail. The project output is a random variable which can take two
values: In case of success, the project generates a positive output X > 0.
Instead, if the project fails, no output is generated and the random variable
takes the value zero. Once the project has been undertaken, the realized
6output is observable and therefore contractible. The success probability is
given by the project characteristic d ∈ D which could describe, for example,
the size of the project or the level of complexity. Depending on the inter-
pretation of d, the meaning of this structure is that a large project is more
likely to succeed than a small one or that a project is more likely to succeed
if it is undertaken with a high intensity level. For example, a new product is
more likely to succeed on the market if it has a high quality.
If project d is undertaken, each agent incurs private costs. Agent i’s cost
function is ci d2 with ci > 0. Without loss of generality agent 1 is assumed to
have a smaller cost parameter than agent 2, that is c1 ≤ c2. To avoid rather
uninteresting corner solutions, we assume c1 and c2 to fulﬁll some further
restrictions. A suﬃcient condition for all relevant projects to be in D = [0,1]
is 2c1+c2 > X. This condition can be relaxed in several situations. The costs
may be non-monetary costs like disutility from eﬀort to spent on the project.
A complex or large project might force both agents to work harder and
increase their private costs. Even though the costs might describe disutility
from work, the action d should not be interpreted as an eﬀort choice1 or
a task assignment2, since in our model the choice of d inﬂuences the costs
of all agents, not only the decision-maker’s costs. For example, when d
represents the quality of a new product, a higher d implies more diﬃcult
and therefore more costly work for the product designer as well as for the
marketing specialist - the latter has to explain a more complex product to
the customers. A complex software is harder to develop and its features are
harder to communicate to the customers. The level of complexity inﬂuences
the private costs of both the software developer and the marketing specialist.
The contract between the agents speciﬁes a payment scheme (wh,wl) car-
ried out conditional on the veriﬁable project output. If the project succeeds,
agent 1 receives the output X and compensates agent 2 with a transfer pay-
ment wh (which might exceed the output). In case of project failure, there is
a transfer wl from agent 1 to agent 2. If a transfer is negative, it is in fact a
payment from agent 2 to agent 1. We assume a budget balance condition in
the sense that the whole output is given to the agents and there is no pos-
sibility to threaten to throw away part of the output instead. Nevertheless,
1An eﬀort choice typically inﬂuences only the decision-maker’s costs but not the other
party’s costs (e.g. Aghion and Tirole (1997)).
2The assignment of tasks as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) diﬀers from our al-
location of authority since only the agent responsible for a task incurs the costs of this
task.
7we do not model a team problem since the agents do not coordinate their
actions.
The agents are risk-neutral and their payoﬀs are composed of their ex-
pected beneﬁts and their private costs. With probability d, the project suc-
ceeds and agent 1 receives X−wh, while with probability 1−d, she gets −wl.
Subtracting the private costs c1d2 results in the payoﬀ function U1. Analo-
gously, agent 2’s payoﬀ U2 is derived. Rearranging the terms gives rise to a
slightly diﬀerent interpretation which considers wl as a transfer independent
of success while wh − wl is in addition carried out in case of success only.
The payoﬀ functions turn out to be
U1(wh,wl,d) = d(X − wh) + (1 − d)(−wl) − c1d
2
= d(X − wh + wl) − wl − c1d
2
U2(wh,wl,d) = dwh + (1 − d)wl − c2d
2
= d(wh − wl) + wl − c2d
2 . (1)
Each agent’s outside option gives a zero payoﬀ. The overall expected surplus
U1 +U2 is independent of the payment scheme and a function of the project
d only. A project d is called (ﬁrst-best) eﬃcient if and only if it maximizes
U1 + U2.
Project d is not necessarily contractible. In our example, the quality of the
new product might be determined by too many details to specify it in a con-
tract. Note that non-contractible project choice implies non-contractible pri-
vate costs since there is an one-to-one relationship between costs and project
characteristic. While the project d itself is non-contractible, the right to
choose a project is assumed to be contractible. This decision right is called
authority. Instead of specifying a certain project, the contract speciﬁes the
allocation of authority denoted by r. If r = 1, agent 1 receives authority
over the project choice, r = 2 gives the decision right to agent 2. The agent
who receives authority is called the decision-maker. After the contract has
been signed, the decision-maker chooses the project to be undertaken, i.e.
the project characteristic d.
The agents share the available expected surplus U1 + U2 according to the
generalized Nash bargaining solution.3 Let α ∈ [0,1] indicate agent 1’s ex-
3Nash (1950) introduced this concept for the case of equal bargaining power. It can
easily be generalized by dropping this symmetry assumption in order to allow for agents
with diﬀerent bargaining power.
8ogenously given bargaining power and (1−α) the bargaining power of agent2.






subject to d ∈ D and the individual rationality constraints (participation
constraints) U1,U2 ≥ 0. Such a contract is called optimal. In case of α = 0
(resp. α = 1), the generalized Nash bargaining results in a principal-agent-
model with agent 2 (resp. agent 1) as a principal who makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer.
If project d is contractible, a contract speciﬁes a payment scheme and
a project so that the maximization of the bargaining function B is over
(wh,wl,d). If d is non-contractible, a contract consists of a payment scheme
and the allocation of authority r so that maximization is over (wh,wl,r). The
decision-maker will choose a project which maximizes her own payoﬀ. Both
agents anticipate this behavior during the negotiation. Thus, the optimiza-
tion of B is restricted by the incentive constraint d ∈ argmaxd0∈D Ur(wh,wl,d0).
If an optimal contract speciﬁes an allocation of authority, this allocation is
called optimal.
As long as the set of possible payment schemes is unrestricted, the follow-
ing situation might arise: If wl 6= 0 or wh / ∈ [0,X], one agent might have
to pay more than she receives after the realization of output. This is not
possible if the agent is wealth-constraint. Even with wealthy agents, such ex
post payments might not be enforceable. Since both agents anticipate this
situation, they restrict the possible payment schemes by the limited liability
constraints wl = 0 and 0 ≤ wh ≤ X. If these constraints are fulﬁlled, there
is no incentive to walk away after the project is done.4 Both agents stick to
the contract in order to receive their predetermined share of project output.
Whenever it is impossible or too costly to enforce a contract which requires
an agent to accept a loss after the realization of output, it seems reasonable
to impose the limited liability constraints (e.g. a non-slavery condition).
The following sections compare contractible versus non-contractible project
choice as well as limited versus unlimited liability. While the other three
cases serve as benchmarks, the main focus of the paper is on non-contractible
project choice under limited liability.
4We assume implicitly here that agent 1, if walking away, cannot take the output X
with her. This simply means that a stipulated sharing of output can always be enforced,
even if additional payments cannot.
93 Contractible Project Choice
This section studies the benchmark case of contractible project choice. A
contract consists of a payment scheme (wh,wl) and a project d ∈ D. Lemma
1 characterizes the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient solution which maximizes overall ex-
pected surplus U1+U2. As Proposition 1 shows, the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project
is implemented even if limited liability constraints are required.
Lemma 1 (First-Best Project) When the project characteristic d is con-





is implemented. The resulting surplus is
U1 + U2 =
X2
4(c1 + c2)
> 0 . (4)
Proof: see Appendix A.
For any given project d, the overall surplus is independent of the payment
scheme. Accordingly, the surplus maximizing project de is also independent
of the payment scheme. The larger the possible project output X and the
smaller the cost parameters c1 and c2, the larger is the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient
project as well as the maximum reachable surplus. The trade-oﬀ between
maximizing success probability and minimizing costs is solved in favor of a
high success probability if success pays a lot and costs do not increase too
fast.
As described in section 2, a contract is optimal (that is, a possible bar-







2 (wh,wl,d) , (5)
subject to d ∈ D and the participation constraints U1,U2 ≥ 0. Under limited
liability, the additional constraints wl = 0 and 0 ≤ wh ≤ X are imposed.
Proposition 1 states the results of the maximization.
10Proposition 1 (Contractible Project Choice) Suppose project choice is
contractible. Then each optimal contract implements the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient
project de. The agents share the resulting surplus according to their bargain-
ing power, that is U1 = α(U1 +U2) and U2 = (1−α)(U1 +U2). These results
still hold true if limited liability constraints are imposed.
Proof: see Appendix A.
An explicit construction of the optimal contracts can be found in Appendix A.
If a project choice is given, there are inﬁnitely many payment schemes which
implement a desired distribution of overall surplus. An optimal contract im-
plements project de which maximizes the surplus and results in a distribution
according to bargaining power. This distribution can be implemented via
every payment scheme fulﬁlling (1−α)(U1 +U2)(de,wh,wl) = U2(de,wh,wl),
that is fulﬁlling the linear equation
dewh + (1 − de)wl − c2d
2




The payment scheme does not inﬂuence the expected overall surplus, but
determines its distribution.
Intuitively, the contract has the three instruments wh,wl and d to control
only two problems, surplus and distribution. One of the variables can be
chosen freely, as can be seen from (6). Therefore, we have inﬁnitely many
optimal contracts (that is, inﬁnitely many bargaining solutions) under un-
limited liability. Under limited liability, wl is ﬁxed to be zero so that the
number of eﬀective instruments is reduced to two. Both optimizations can
still be done independently so that the ﬁrst-best solution is still implemented.
But there is only one payment scheme fulﬁlling (6) and the limited liability
constraints simultaneously, leading to a unique bargaining outcome. This





+ 1 − α

. (7)
If the project succeeds, the agents share half of the project output X accord-
ing to bargaining power, the other half according to cost share. E.g. agent 2
who has bargaining power 1−α and cost share c2/(c1+c2) receives wh given
in (7). Overall expected surplus is shared according to bargaining power.
11In summary, if project choice is contractible, there are no distortions even if
limited liability is required. There are at least as many instruments available
as problems to solve. But under limited liability, the multiplicity of optimal
contracts boils down to a unique solution.
4 Non-Contractible Project Choice
In what follows, the project choice is non-contractible and only the alloca-
tion of authority can be contracted upon. Throughout this section, assume
unlimited liability so that wl,wh ∈ R. We show that the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient
project is still implemented and the allocation of authority, even if exoge-
nously ﬁxed, does not have any impact.
A contract consists of a payment scheme (wh,wl) and an allocation of
authority r ∈ {1,2}. Agent r is the decision-maker who receives the right
to choose the project d ∈ D once the contract is signed. At the contracting
stage, both agents anticipate that the decision-maker will choose a project
which maximizes her own payoﬀ. This adds an incentive constraint to the






subject to U1,U2 ≥ 0 and
d ∈ argmaxd0∈D Ur(wh,wl,d
0) . (9)
The future decision-making of the decision-maker is reﬂected by (9). Propo-
sition 2 shows the results.
Proposition 2 (Non-Contractible Project Choice) Suppose project
choice is non-contractible. There are exactly two optimal contracts, one gives
the authority to agent 1 while the other one gives it to agent 2. Both optimal
contracts implement the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project de and the agents share the
resulting surplus according to their bargaining power, that is U1 = α(U1+U2)
and U2 = (1 − α)(U1 + U2).
Proof: see Appendix A.
If agent 1 is the decision-maker, her incentive constraint is
d =








if agent 2 has the decision right. Therefore, the project choice is determined
by the decision-maker’s cost parameter together with wh − wl. Given an
allocation of authority and wh − wl, the size of overall expected surplus is
ﬁxed. The distribution of overall expected surplus still varies with wl. While
the appropriate wh−wl ensures the implementation of the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient
project, the appropriate wl enforces a distribution of overall surplus according
to bargaining power. A contract has the two instruments wh,wl to determine
surplus and distribution. Therefore, surplus and distribution may be opti-
mized independently and the ﬁrst-best solution is reached. The ﬁrst-best
payment scheme is independent of the allocation of authority since maxi-
mizing one agent’s payoﬀ and overall surplus implies maximizing the other
agent’s payoﬀ. Since eﬃciency is attained, the optimal payment scheme
is necessarily one of the optimal payment schemes in case of contractible
project choice given in (6). Even if the decision right is exogenously ﬁxed,
the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project is implemented and payoﬀs are independent of
the allocation of authority.
To compare these results with the case of limited liability in section 5, re-
call that we might consider wl as a transfer independent of success and wh−wl
as an additional transfer carried out in case of success only. Therefore, wh−wl
and X − wh + wl can be viewed as a bonus received if the project succeeds.
In this case, each agent receives a share of the project output according to
her share of overall costs: agent 1 earns X − wh + wl = c1/(c1 + c2) X and
agent 2 gets wh − wl = c2/(c1 + c2) X. This bonus is independent of bar-
gaining power because it is the instrument to optimize overall surplus, that
is, to implement the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project. This project is independent
of bargaining power as well.


















depends crucially on the relationship between bargaining power and cost
share. It is the instrument to implement the optimal distribution which is
determined by bargaining power.
13The agent who has a bargaining power larger than the cost share receives
a payment. Such an agent might be called ”powerful” since her bargaining
power is large compared to her cost share. If α < c1/(c1 + c2), it is wl >
0 and agent 1 pays a transfer to agent 2 who is the powerful one in this
situation. In case of α > c1/(c1 + c2), agent 1 is the powerful agent and
receives a payment since wl < 0. The optimal payment scheme is one of
the optimal payment schemes in case of contractible project choice under
unlimited liability, but it is diﬀerent from the optimal payment scheme in
case of contractible project choice under limited liability. If project choice is
non-contractible, the optimal contract fulﬁlls the limited liability constraints
if and only if α = c1/(c1 +c2), that is, if bargaining power equals cost share.
In case of non-contractible project choice, there are no ineﬃciencies and
the allocation of authority does not have any impact. There are as many
instruments available as problems so solve. Payments (wh,wl) determine the
surplus and its distribution. Bargaining power determines the optimal distri-
bution of surplus, but does not play any further role. But for any bargaining
power α 6= c1/(c1 + c2), limited liability is not fulﬁlled and imposing limited
liability is expected to create some distortions.
5 Non-Contractible Project Choice
under Limited Liability
We now consider the case of non-contractible project choice under the lim-
ited liability constraints wl = 0 and 0 ≤ wh ≤ X. The agents simply share
the project output and do not perform any additional transfer payments.
Imposing limited liability constraints usually creates a trade-oﬀ between sur-
plus maximization and rent extraction. Under limited liability, it is no longer
possible to maximize overall surplus and extract a rent share according to
bargaining power at the same time. Subsection 5.1 analyzes the case of an
exogenously given allocation of authority. We show that the ﬁrst-best ef-
ﬁcient project is no longer implemented as soon as bargaining power does
not reﬂect the relative cost share. The results are used in subsection 5.2 to
analyze the impact of bargaining power and cost structure on the allocation
of authority. It turns out that large diﬀerences in cost parameters make the
bargaining power less important since both agents prefer the allocation of
authority which leads to a larger surplus compared to the alternative alloca-
tion. If the agents are similar in cost parameters, it is mainly the bargaining
power which determines the allocation of authority.
145.1 Exogenous Allocation of Authority
With wl = 0 the payoﬀ functions become
U1 = d(X − wh) − c1d
2 ,
U2 = dwh − c2d
2 . (13)







subject to U1,U2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ wh ≤ X and
d ∈ argmaxd0∈D U¯ r(wh,d
0) . (15)
Lemma 2 (Agent 1 decides) Consider the case of non-contractible project
choice under limited liability. Let agent 1 be the decision-maker so that r = 1.





which is the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project de if and only if α = c1/(c1 +c2). It is
d1 T de ⇐⇒ α T c1/(c1 + c2) . (17)
The payment in case of success is
wh =
c2 + (1 − α)c1
2c1 + c2
X . (18)
Proof: see Appendix A.
Solving d1 = de for α shows that in case of r = 1, the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient
project de is implemented if and only if each agent’s bargaining power equals
her cost share so that α = c1/(c1 + c2). If the decision-maker agent 1 is
too powerful in terms of bargaining power, that is α > c1/(c1 + c2), she
implements an ineﬃciently large project d1 > de. Since X−wh is increasing in
α, a powerful agent 1 can extract a large share of the output in case of success.
She beneﬁts from a large project choice. Instead, if α < c1/(c1 + c2), it does
not pay to choose a large and, therefore, costly project since the extra rent
15from success is small. A project smaller than ﬁrst-best is implemented. The
following Lemma states the respective results for agent 2 being the decision-
maker, which is simply a mirror of Lemma 2 - replace wh ↔ X − wh,α ↔
1 − α,c1 ↔ c2 and note that the agents changed their roles.
Lemma 3 (Agent 2 decides) Consider the case of non-contractible project
choice under limited liability. Let agent 2 be the decision-maker, that is r = 2.





which is the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project de if and only if α = c1/(c1 + c2).
Proof: see Appendix A.
Exactly as in Lemma 2, the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project de is implemented if
and only if α = c1/(c1 + c2). Again, a decision-maker who is too powerful,
that is 1 − α > c2/(c1 + c2) resp. α < c1/(c1 + c2), implements a project
larger than ﬁrst-best since she can extract a large share of output in case of
success. If instead α > c1/(c1 + c2), the decision-maker agent 2 implements
a project smaller than ﬁrst-best. As soon as α 6= c1/(c1 + c2), the ﬁrst-best
eﬃcient project is no longer implemented. Giving the decision right to the
agent with bargaining power larger than cost share will lead to a project “too
large” while giving it to the other agent will result in a project “too small”
compared to the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient one.
Under unlimited liability, we have seen in section 4 that wh−wl determines
the project characteristic while wl determines (given wh−wl) the distribution
of surplus. Both the surplus and its distribution are optimized independently.
But under limited liability, wl = 0 is ﬁxed and a contract has only one
instrument to determine surplus and distribution. The wage wh determines
both the project choice (which ﬁxes the surplus) and the distribution of
surplus. Those cannot be optimized simultaneously since there is only one
instrument to solve two problems. A trade oﬀ between surplus maximization
and rent extraction (which is distribution) occurs. A wh which compensates
the decision-maker for a surplus-oriented decision-making - that is, a wh
leading to the implementation of the ﬁrst-best project - would result in a
distribution of surplus far from reﬂecting bargaining power. On the other
hand, a wh which implements a distribution according to bargaining power
would result in a surplus much smaller than the ﬁrst-best surplus.
165.2 Allocation of Authority via Bargaining
If the allocation of authority is a result of the bargaining process, the trade
oﬀ between rent extraction and surplus maximization concerns not only the
payment scheme but also the allocation of authority. We start this subsection
with the observation that the cost parameters determine diﬀerences in overall
surplus for the two allocations. Proposition 3 analyzes the allocation of
authority subject to bargaining power and cost parameters. It turns out
that if the agents are similar in cost structure, bargaining power determines
the allocation and rent extraction is favored over surplus maximization. But
in case of very diﬀerent cost parameters, the surplus is decisive and the
allocation of authority is mainly inﬂuenced by cost structure. In this case
even a powerful agent does not receive authority if this would lead to a
decrease of overall surplus. As a benchmark, Lemma 4 describes the impact
of authority on the overall surplus.
Lemma 4 (Allocation of Authority and Overall Surplus) In case of
non-contractible project choice under limited liability, overall surplus depends
on the allocation of authority if and only if α 6= c1/(c1 + c2). The distortion
relative to ﬁrst-best for the two allocations can be compared by
|d1 − de| = de
|α(c1 + c2) − c1|
2c1 + c2
|d2 − de| = de
|α(c1 + c2) − c1|
c1 + 2c2
. (20)
If the agent with the larger cost share receives the decision right, overall
surplus is larger compared to the alternative allocation of authority. Since
c1 ≤ c2 by assumption, the surplus is larger if authority is allocated to agent
2.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Since overall expected surplus U1+U2 is a symmetric function with its unique
maximum in de, the distance |d − de| is an appropriate measure for the loss
of surplus (compared to ﬁrst-best) occurring if project d is implemented.
As already mentioned, the decision-maker’s project choice is distorted away
from the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project because bargaining power does not reﬂect
cost share. This is measured by |α(c1 + c2) − c1| which is independent of
the allocation of authority. If any other source of distortion is eliminated
by assuming agents who diﬀer only in bargaining power, that is assuming
17c1 = c2, both possible allocations of authority result in the same amount of
distortion |d1−de| = |d2−de|. What one agent chooses “too much” is exactly
what the other one chooses “too little” compared to ﬁrst-best. Still, the size
of the distortion depends on bargaining power.
If c1 6= c2, there is an additional source of distortion measured by the
terms 2c1 +c2 resp. c1 +2c2. When choosing the project, the decision-maker
cares about her own costs, but does not fully internalize the externalities
exerted on the other agent. That is, she puts too little weight to the other
agent’s costs. This is reﬂected by the denominators in (20), showing that
the distortion is less drastic, if authority is given to the agent with the larger
cost share. Therefore, the overall surplus is larger if agent 2 (who has the
larger cost parameter) is the decision-maker.
But the bargaining might as well result in agent 1 being the decision-






subject to U1,U2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ wh ≤ X and
d ∈ argmaxd0∈D Ur(wh,d
0) . (22)
To state the following Proposition, we deﬁne
φ(k,α) := (2k + 1)
1+α (2 − α)
2−α α
α
− (k + 2)
2−αk
α (1 + α)
1+α (1 − α)
1−α (23)
with k := c1/c2.
Proposition 3 (Allocation of Authority) Consider the case of non-con-
tractible project choice under limited liability. Generalized Nash bargaining
results in the unique optimal contract if and only if φ(k,α) 6= 0. If φ(k,α) <
0, agent 1 receives authority, while in case of φ(k,α) > 0 it is allocated to
agent 2. If φ(k,α) = 0, there are two optimal contracts which diﬀer in the
allocation of authority.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Figure 1 shows a contour plot of φ with k on the horizontal axes and α on
the vertical axes. The plot approximates the sets of (k,α) with φ(k,α) > 0























































Figure 1: Contour plot of φ(k,α) describing the allocation of authority r
authority is allocated to agent 2 if her bargaining power 1 − α is large. If
agent 1’s bargaining power α increases suﬃciently, the allocation of authority
switches towards agent 1. Instead, for small k the allocation is independent of
the bargaining power and agent 2 decides. On the other hand, given a small
α, the decision-maker is agent 2 independent of k. Given a large α and a small
k, authority is given to agent 2. But a suﬃcient increase in k changes the
allocation so that agent 1 receives the decision right. The upper right corner
which is characterized by a large k and a large α describes the parameter
constellations which result in agent 1 being the decision-maker. If agent
1’s bargaining power is large and simultaneously her cost share nearly equals
agent 2’s cost share, she receives authority. The allocation of authority is not
unique along the curve separating this area from the remaining parameter
constellations. This curve describes a switch from φ(k,α) > 0 to φ(k,α) < 0,
which is a switch in the allocation of authority. In addition, the allocation is
not unique along the curve α = k/(k + 1) which in fact is α = c1/(c1 + c2).
This curve does not describe a switch in the allocation, it is φ(k,α) > 0
above as well as below this line. Below this curve, the decision-maker agent
2 is powerful (having bargaining power larger than cost share) and chooses
a project larger than the ﬁrst-best project, while above this curve she is
19still the decision-maker, but chooses a project smaller than ﬁrst-best. On
the curve α = c1/(c1 + c2), the allocation is not unique but the ﬁrst-best
project is implemented. If α and k are large enough so that agent 1 decides,
the decision-maker is again powerful and a project larger than ﬁrst-best is
implemented.
Under unlimited liability, each agent receives a ﬁxed share of the surplus
determined by her bargaining power. The agents’ common goal is to maxi-
mize the surplus. Under limited liability, there is a trade oﬀ between surplus
maximization and rent extraction. If the agents have similar cost shares, the
allocation of authority does not have much inﬂuence on the surplus. Rent
extraction becomes important. In the extreme c1 = c2, the overall expected
surplus is even independent of the allocation of authority. For each agent,
getting the decision right increases the payoﬀ. The agent with the larger bar-
gaining power receives authority. To understand the shape of the parameter
constellation allocating authority to agent 1, start with k = 1 and consider
a small decrease in k. Now the allocation of authority has two impacts: If
agent 1 is the decision-maker, overall surplus is smaller compared to agent
2 being the decision-maker. But on the other hand, agent 1 can extract a
larger share of overall surplus. If she receives authority, agent 1 ends up with
a larger share of a smaller surplus. An increase in α increases the impact
of the allocation on the share of the rent.5 If agent 1 is the decision-maker,
an increase in α decreases overall surplus but increases her share of the rent.
The larger α, the more agent 1 beneﬁts from having the decision-right. If
α is above a certain threshold, agent 1 is better oﬀ if she receives authority
instead of agent 2 being the decision-maker. In addition, the large α enables
her to get the desired authority. If α and k are large enough, agent 1 receives
authority. If k is quite small instead, even a very powerful agent 1 does not
receive authority, but beneﬁts from the large surplus realized by the decision
of agent 2. Therefore, the cost structure plays a decisive role in allocating
decision rights which - in some parameter constellations - even outweighs the
inﬂuence of bargaining power.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a simple model of the allocation of author-
ity in a joint project. Generalized Nash bargaining allocates authority to the
agent with the larger cost share as long as the other agent has a signiﬁcantly
5This can be seen from direct calculation of rent share.
20smaller cost share or is not too powerful. This allocation results in a larger
surplus compared to the alternative allocation. But a very powerful agent
can receive the decision right even though she has the smaller cost share so
that her decision-making results in a smaller surplus. This happens if the
agents diﬀer not too much in cost shares. In this case, the decision-maker
beneﬁts from authority by receiving a larger share of a smaller surplus com-
pared to the alternative allocation of authority. If on the other hand the
agents are very diﬀerent in cost shares, even a very powerful agent does not
receive authority. Both agents beneﬁt from the larger surplus reached by
allocating authority to the one with the larger cost share.
In our model, a decision undertaken by one of the agents has an im-
pact on all agents involved so that an externality is exerted. As long as the
decision is contractible, ﬁrst-best eﬃciency is reached even if limited liabil-
ity constraints are imposed. If the decision is non-contractible, the decision
right is contractually assigned to one of the agents. Under unlimited lia-
bility, the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project is still implemented. The allocation of
authority is undetermined - both possible allocations are ﬁrst-best eﬃcient
bargaining solutions. This is in line with the ﬁndings in Aghion and Bolton
(1992) and Aghion and Rey (2003) for wealthy agents. Imposing limited lia-
bility constraints now creates a trade oﬀ between rent extraction and surplus
maximization. The decision-maker cannot be compensated for choosing the
ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project. The resulting loss compared to the ﬁrst-best sur-
plus is smaller if authority is allocated to the the agent with the larger cost
share, independent of the agents’ bargaining power. This result is diﬀerent
from Aghion and Rey (2003) whose model requires to allocate authority to
the party with the lower bargaining power to increase eﬃciency. Their model
considers ex post renegotiation while our model, in contrast, incorporates ex
ante bargaining.
Bargaining power inﬂuences the surplus in two ways. First, for an exoge-
nously given allocation of authority, bargaining power inﬂuences decision-
making. The loss compared to the ﬁrst-best surplus depends on how the
agents’ bargaining power reﬂects the cost structure. The closer the decision-
maker’s bargaining power is to her cost share, the smaller is the loss. Second,
the distortion of the decision-maker’s choice also depends on the relationship
between the two agent’s costs. The allocation of authority inﬂuences overall
surplus. Because the allocation is a bargaining outcome, it clearly depends
on bargaining power. Therefore, bargaining power inﬂuences who receives
authority and how this party executes authority.
21While ex ante participation constraints create ineﬃciencies in Aghion and
Bolton (1992) as well as Aghion and Rey (2003), they play a minor role in
our model, because participation constraints do not bind in any of the cases
except for agents without any bargaining power.
Our results for the case of non-contractible project choice under limited
liability base upon the fact that there is only one instrument to solve two
problems, surplus maximization and distribution of surplus. Adding another
instrument should solve the arising ineﬃciencies. Therefore, one might ar-
gue that our results rely on the binary character of the project outcome. To
see that this is not the case, assume the project has three instead of two
possible outcomes so that the payment scheme contains an additional pay-
ment carried out if the third outcome occurs. If the probabilities are further
on assumed to be linear, the situation with three possible project outcomes
can be reduced to a situation with only two possible outcomes6, but possi-
bly with a strict positive project outcome in case of failure. Allowing for a
positive outcome in case of failure does not change the results substantially.
Our model turns out to be robust to the number of possible project outcomes.
The approach has a wide variety of applications, ranging from two-person
projects to institutional relationships. Research joint ventures or other coop-
erations inside or between ﬁrms might be modeled. The project, for example,
could be the introduction of a new product. The product characteristic in-
ﬂuences the costs of several departments or several ﬁrms involved as well
as the probability of a successful launch. Possible extensions of the model
include the division of tasks in multi-task projects, the introduction of eﬀort
incentives for the involved agents and third-party involvement with collusion.
These are left for future research.
6To see this, you simply have to rearrange the payoﬀ functions.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
The surplus U1 + U2 is a function of d independent of the payment scheme.
Maximizing U1 + U2 by solving the ﬁrst order condition yields the project
de and the surplus U1 + U2 = (U1 + U2)(de) = X2/[4(c1 + c2)]. Since
0 < X < c1 + 2c2 < 2(c1 + c2), we have de ∈ [0,1] = D and U1 + U2 > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1:







2 (wh,wl,d) , (24)
subject to d ∈ D and the participation constraints U1,U2 ≥ 0. The ﬁrst order













































= 0 . (25)
For the moment, assume there is at least one contract with B > 0 fulﬁlling
the constraints so that each optimal contract satisﬁes B > 0 as well. One of
the following three cases must apply: It is either U1,U2 > 0 or U1 > 0,U2 =
0,α = 1 or U1 = 0,U2 > 0,α = 0. The last two cases imply B = U1+U2 and
Lemma 1 gives d = de ∈ D. Furthermore, it follows that αU2 = (1 − α)U1
and therefore U1 = α(U1 + U2) and U2 = (1 − α)(U1 + U2).




2 > 0 holds as well. The system (25) can


















+ (1 − α)U1
∂U2
∂wh
= 0 . (26)
Since ∂U1/∂wl = −∂U2/∂wl = −(1 − d) and ∂U1/∂wh = −∂U2/∂wh = −d,
and the two expressions cannot be zero at the same time, the second and
third equation are fulﬁlled if and only if αU2 = (1 − α)U1. This yields the
sharing rule U1 = α(U1 + U2) resp. U2 = (1 − α)(U1 + U2) as stated in the
Proposition.
From U1,U2 > 0 it follows that αU2 = (1 − α)U1 > 0 and α ∈ (0,1).
Plugging αU2 = (1−α)U1 into the ﬁrst equation gives ∂U1/∂d+∂U2/∂d = 0
which is the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing U1 + U2 in d. Lemma 1
again implies d = de ∈ D.














Since αU2 = (1 − α)U1 leads to U1 = α(U1 + U2) ≥ 0 with equality if and
only if α = 0 and U2 = (1 − α)(U1 + U2) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if
α = 1, the ad-hoc-assumption of B > 0 is justiﬁed. A contract is optimal if
and only if d = de and (27) are satisﬁed.
Now impose the limited liability constraints wl = 0 and 0 ≤ wh ≤ X. The





+ 1 − α

(28)
meets the limited liability constraints and is optimal (even without requiring
limited liability) since the payment scheme fulﬁlls (27). To see the uniqueness
of the optimal contract under limited liability, note that any other contract
either hurts the limited liability constraints or equation (27). In the latter
case, the contract results in a smaller B and is not optimal. 
25Proof of Proposition 2:






subject to U1,U2 ≥ 0 and
d ∈ argmaxd0∈D Ur(wh,wl,d
0) . (30)
To ﬁnd the optimal contract(s), calculate the optimal contract(s) given r = 1
as well as the optimal contract(s) given r = 2. Among these contracts, ﬁnd
the optimal one(s) by evaluating the bargaining function.
Let r = 1 so that agent 1 is the decision-maker. Once the contract is
signed, she will choose project d∗ maximizing U1 over D given wh,wl, that is
d
∗ =
X − wh + wl
2c1
(31)
if this expression is an element of D. Assume for the moment that d∗ ∈ D and
note that d∗ is the unique maximum of U1(wh,wl,d). Both agents anticipate
the later implementation of d∗ during the bargaining process. Plugging in d∗
gives
U1 =




X − wh + wl
2c1
(wh − wl) + wl −


































= 0 . (33)
From now on, the procedure is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
Making the ad-hoc assumption of B > 0 for the optimal contract(s), there
are again three possible cases: U1,U2 > 0 or U1 > 0,U2 = 0,α = 1 or
U1 = 0,U2 > 0,α = 0. The latter two cases imply B = U1 + U2. Some
straight forward calculations show that the maximum of B = U1 + U2 is
reached in wh − wl = c2/(c1 + c2) X. Using (32), it follows αU2 = (1 − α)U1
so that U1 = α(U1 + U2) and U2 = (1 − α)(U1 + U2).




















+ (1 − α)U1
∂U2
∂wh
= 0 . (34)
Since ∂U1/∂wl = −1−∂U1/∂wh and ∂U2/∂wl = 1−∂U2/∂wh, the conditions
in case of U1,U2 > 0 are equivalent to








The ﬁrst equation implies α ∈ (0,1). Rearranging the second equation again
leads to




which now holds for all three cases. Using (31) gives
d
∗ = de . (37)
The assumption d∗ ∈ D is justiﬁed. According to Lemma 1, the implementa-
tion of the project results in a surplus U1 +U2 = X2/[4(c1 +c2)]. Combined
with αU2 = (1 − α)U1, it follows that U1 ≥ 0 with equality if and only if
α = 0 and U2 ≥ 0 with equality if and only if α = 1. The ad-hoc assump-
tion B > 0 is justiﬁed. Some straightforward calculations using these results
together with (32) and (36) give the unique payment scheme
wl =
X2
4(c1 + c2)2 [−αc2 + (1 − α)c1]
wh =
X2




To summarize, the unique optimal contract given r = 1 is described by (38).
Now assume r = 2 and proceed analogue to the case r = 1. Note that
the two problems are symmetric by α ↔ (1 − α),c1 ↔ c2,wl ↔ −wl and






once the contract is signed. Maximizing the bargaining function B results
in exactly the same payment scheme and project as if r = 1. The payment
scheme is determined by (38) and the project de is implemented.
27To summarize, there are two contracts which are candidates for an optimal
contract, one with r = 1 and one with r = 2. Both contracts implement
project de and payment scheme (38). Hence the payoﬀs U1 and U2 as well
as the bargaining function B take the same values in both cases. The two
candidates turn out to be the optimal contracts. 
Proof of Lemma 2:








subject to 0 ≤ wh ≤ X, U1,U2 ≥ 0, and d ∈ argmaxd0∈D U1(wh,d0). Once
the contract is signed, the decision-maker agent 1 chooses a project in order





as long as it is an element of D. For the moment, assume d1 ∈ D. Plugging






























The remaining proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. Assume that
there is at least one contract fulﬁlling B > 0 and the required constraints
so that each optimal contract satisﬁes B > 0 as well. Since U1 = 0 implies
wh = X which in turn implies U2 = 0 and ﬁnally B = 0, it is necessarily
U1 > 0 and wh < X. There are only two possible cases, namely U1,U2 > 0
or U1 > 0,U2 = 0,α = 1.




2 > 0 leads to































= 0 . (45)
Since wh = X is already ruled out, the unique solution of (45) is
wh =
c2 + (1 − α)c1
2c1 + c2
X . (46)
Solving U2 = 0 for wh gives exactly the same payment for the case U1 >
0,U2 = 0,α = 1.





which is in D since 1 + α ≤ 2 and 2c1 + c2 > X by assumption. Using (42),
(46) and (47) give
U1 =
(1 + α)2X2c1
4(2c1 + c2)2 > 0 (48)
and
U2 =
(1 − α)(1 + α)X2
4(2c1 + c2)
≥ 0 (49)
with equality if and only if α = 1. The ad-hoc assumption B > 0 is justiﬁed.

Proof of Lemma 3:
The proof is completely analogue to Lemma 2, simply replace wh ↔ X −
wh,α ↔ 1 − α,c1 ↔ c2 and note that the agents changed their roles. The






29in the end. It is d2 ∈ D since 2 − α ≤ 2 and c1 + 2c2 ≥ 2c1 + c2 > X by







4(c1 + 2c2)2 > 0 (52)
with equality if and only if α = 0 so that B > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 4:
Note that U1 + U2 = dX − (c1 + c2)d2 is a parabola open below with its
maximum in de. To put it diﬀerently, U1+U2 is strictly decreasing in |d−de|.
It is











   
X[αc2 − (1 − α)c1]
2(2c1 + c2)(c1 + c2)
   
= de















   
X[αc2 − (1 − α)c1]
2(c1 + 2c2)(c1 + c2)
   
= de
|α(c1 + c2) − c1|
c1 + 2c2
. (54)
It is |d1−de| = |d2−de| = 0 if and only if α = c1/(c1+c2). The allocation of
authority does not inﬂuence overall surplus in this case. If α 6= c1/(c1 + c2),
we have






⇐⇒ c1 ≤ c2 . (55)
The surplus is increased by allocating authority to the agent with the larger
cost share who is agent 2 by assumption c1 ≤ c2. 
30Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider r = 1. Using U1 and U2 from the proof of Lemma 2, the value of










1 (1 + α)
1+α (1 − α)
1−α =: B1 . (56)










2 (2 − α)
2−α α
α =: B2 . (57)
If and only if B1 = B2, there are two optimal contracts which diﬀer in the
allocation of authority. If and only if B1 6= B2, the optimal contract (and
therefore the allocation of authority) is unique. Agent 1 is the decision-maker
in case of B1 > B2, while agent 2 receives authority if B2 > B1.








2 (1 + α)













B2 T B1 ⇐⇒ φ(k,α) T 0 (60)
with
φ(k,α) := (2k + 1)
1+α (2 − α)
2−α α
α
− (k + 2)
2−αk
α (1 + α)
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